

Message Text

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10

ORIGIN NEA-16

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 IO-14 ISO-00 AEC-11 SCI-06 AID-20

ACDA-19 L-03 PM-07 NSC-07 SP-03 SS-20 RSC-01 FEA-02

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APPROVED BY NEA:LBLAINGEN

AEC - DR. FRIEDMAN

SCI:NFSIEVERING

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R 162201Z AUG 74

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

INFO AMCONSUL BOMBAY

USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 180709

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: TECH, IN, US

SUBJECT: TARAPUR

FOR AMBASSADOR

1. SUMMARY: USG REPS ADVISED INDIANS THAT WE HAD NOT FOUND SETHNA RESPONSE TO US LETTER ON TARAPUR SUFFICIENT BASIS ON WHICH TO RESUME SHIPMENTS OF SENSORS AND ENRICHED FUEL. OFFERED DRAFT OF POSSIBLE NEW US LETTER, STRESSING OUR DESIRE SEEK PRACTICAL SOLUTION NOT STANDOFF. INDIANS DOUBTED PROPOSED US LETTER WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE, BUT AGREED TO FORWARD TO GOI. END SUMMARY.

2. USG REPS (STATE: LAINGEN, SIEVERING, KUX, AEC FRIEDMAN, CONFIDENTIAL

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PENDER AND OMENN) MET WITH INDIAN EMBASSY DCM GONSALVES AND

ECONOMIC MINISTER RAMAKRISHNA AUGUST 14 ON TARAPUR ASSURANCE PROBLEM. LAINGEN EXPLAINED THAT ON BASIS PREVIOUS EXCHANGE OF LETTERS USG NOT NOW ABLE TO PROCEED WITH FURTHER SHIPMENTS. WE STILL NEEDED CLEAR ASSURANCE FROM INDIANS THAT US SUPPLIED MATERIAL FOR TARAPUR WOULD NOT BE USED IN NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES. THIS WAS MATTER OF POLICY FOR US, AND WE ALSO FACED CONSIDERABLE CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURES. BUT WE WANTED PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO

PROBLEM, IN SPIRIT OF NEW AND MORE MATURE RELATIONSHIP WITH INDIA AND PARTICULARLY AS REFLECTED IN SECRETARY'S RECENT CONVERSATION WITH KEWAL SINGH ON NUCLEAR AND OTHER ASPECTS OUR RELATIONSHIP. WE HAD THEREFORE PREPARED NEW DRAFT LETTER WHICH WE ASKED GOI SERIOUSLY AND SYMPATHETICALLY CONSIDER AND GIVE US INFORMAL INDICATION OF WHAT SORT OF RESPONSE THEY MIGHT BE ABLE TO MAKE. WE WANTED AVOID CONFRONTATION ON THIS ISSUE AND ANOTHER ROUND OF EXCHANGING UNSATISFACTORY LETTERS IF POSSIBLE. TEXT OF DRAFT LETTER AS FOLLOWS:

DEAR DR. SETHNA:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF JULY 10 RESPONDING TO MINE OF JUNE 19 CONCERNING SHIPMENTS OF ENRICHED URANIUM FUEL AND OTHER MATERIAL TO THE TARAPUR ATOMIC POWER STATION.

YOUR RESPONSE LEADS US TO BELIEVE THAT WE MAY NOT HAVE MADE SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR THE NATURE OF THE ASSURANCE FROM YOUR GOVERNMENT THAT THE SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL THAT HAS BEEN OR IS HEREAFTER MADE AVAILABLE FOR, OR USED OR PRODUCED IN, THE TARAPUR ATOMIC POWER STATION WILL BE DEVOTED EXCLUSIVELY TO THE NEEDS OF THAT STATION OR OTHER AGREED PURPOSES THAT DO NOT INCLUDE USE IN A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE.

WE LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM YOU ON THIS IN ORDER THAT WE MAY PROMPTLY PROCEED WITH FURTHER SHIPMENTS.

SINCERELY, DIXY LEE RAY
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3. FRIEDMAN ELABORATED THAT INDIAN RESPONSE HAD NOT ADDRESSED NUCLEAR EXPLOSION QUESTION WITH REGARD TO TARAPUR. AS RESULT THERE REMAINED UNCERTAINTY ON THE RECORD AS TO WHAT INDIANS THOUGHT THEY COULD OR COULD NOT USE TARAPUR MATERIAL FOR. WE NEEDED REMOVE THIS UNCERTAINTY WHILE TARAPUR AGREEMENT, WHICH PROVIDED FOR VIRTUAL "CLOSED LOOP" OPERATION, (I.E. FUEL MATERIAL AVAILABLE ONLY FOR

USE WITH TARAPUR STATION, STORAGE OR TRANSFER WITH USF PERMISSION) IN SENSE CAME CLOSE TO RENDERING DIVERSION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL TO PNE'S MOOT QUESTION, LAST INDIAN RESPONSE SUGGESTS THAT THEY MAY HAVE DIFFERENT INTERPRETATION OF THE AGREEMENT.

4. RAMAKRISHNA SAID HE DID NOT SEE WHY INDIAN PROPOSAL THAT WE BUY BACK MATERIAL DID NOT MEET US NEED, SINCE MATERIAL COULD NOT THEN BE USED FOR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES. FRIEDMAN SAID THIS WAS TRUE, BUT US DIDNOT WISH TO EXERCISE OPTION AND THAT IN ANY EVENT THIS PROPOSED INDIAN SOLUTION SUGGESTS INDIANS COULD BE FREE TO USE SUPPLIED MATERIAL FOR PNES UNLESS US EXERCISE OPTION. WE CANNOT HAVE OUR EXCHANGE AND DISCUSSIONS UNCLEAR ON THAT POINT.

5. IN DISCUSSION THAT FOLLOWED, INITIAL REACTION OF RAMAKRISHNA AND GONSALVES INDICATED THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT AS MATTER OF POLICY AND DOMESTIC POLITICS FOR INDIA TO GIVE EXPLICIT REASSURANCE THAT AGREEMENT RULED OUT PNE USE. THEY SUGGESTED THIS AMOUNTED TO CHANGING AGREEMENT AFTER THE FACT AND WOULD CREATE POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES IN INDIA. IN RESPONSE TO GONSALVES QUERY, HOW THE US DEALT WITH THE PROBLEM WITH OTHER COUNTRIES, PENDER SAID PROBLEM DID,NOT ARISE IN AGREEMENTS WITH NPT PARTIES SINCE THEY HAD FORESWORN PNES. IN CASE NON-NPT PARTIES, WE HAVE TAKEN STEPS TO SATISFY OURSELVES THAT THERE IS NO PROBLEM ON THE POINT; ONLY INDIA HAS TAKEN ISSUE WITH US AS TO WHAT US AGREEMENTS MEAN IN THIS RESPECT.

6. INDIANS SAID THEY WOULD SEND OUR LETTER BACK TO GOI FOR COMMENT. US REPS STRESSED DESIRE TO SOLVE PROBLEM IN PRACTICAL WAY. WHILE LANGUAGE HAD APPROVAL HIGH LEVELS IN USG, WE NOT WED TO SPECIFIC WORDS IF OTHERSWOULD MEET CONFIDENTIAL

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OUR NEEDS AND BE PREFERABLE TO INDIANS.

7. FOR DELHI: INDIAN RESPONSE NOT UNEXPECTED, ALTHOUGH SESSION WAS FRIENDLY AND BUSINESSLIKE. NUB OF PROBLEM CLEARLY IS INDIAN RELUCTANCE TO GIVE US FLAT STATEMENT THEY WILL NOT USE TARAPUR MATERIAL FOR PNES EVEN THOUGH THEY PREPARED TO ACT IN THIS WAY THROUGH BUY-BACK PROPOSAL.

8. WE NOW NEED YOU TO WEIGH IN AT YOUR END IN WHAT WE REGARD AS PRACTICAL AND REASONABLE EXERCISE WITH INDIANS. ALL WE ARE ASKING IS THAT THEY AGREE WITH US THAT TARAPUR AGREEMENT MEANS WHAT IN EFFECT AND IN TERMS WELL KNOWN US POLICY WHAT IT SAYS; I.E. THAT MATERIAL THAT WE SUPPLY TO THIS PARTICULAR PROJECT WILL NOT BE USED IN NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES. (WE NOTE INCIDENTIALLY THAT

INDIANS INDICATED TO CANADIANS THEY WERE PREPARED TO PROVIDE SUCH ASSURANCES TO THEM ON RAPP. STATE 173030).

9. YOU SHOULD TAKE UP OUR PROPOSED DRAFT WITH KEWAL SINGH, SEEKING HIS UNDERSTANDING FOR PROBLEMS WE FACE ON THIS SPECIFIC ISSUE, EMPHASIZING OUR DESIRE TO MOVE PROMPTLY TOWARD MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION SO THAT SHIPMENTS CAN RESUME AND THAT ISSUE CAN BE RESOLVED WELL BEFORE SECRETARY'S VISIT. WE ALSO NOTE THAT YOU PLAN TO VISIT BOMBAY IN NEXT FEW DAYS AND BELIEVE IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL IF YOU FOLLOWED UP OUR APPROACH DIRECTLY WITH HOMI SETHNA, INDIAN AEC CHAIRMAN, WHO WE PRESUME WILL BE KEY PERSON IN PREPARING INDIAN RESPONSE.

KISSINGER

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